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Friday February 23, 2007

Olmert-Rice-Abbas summit lives down to expectations

by leslie susser
jta

jerusalem | No one expected the tripartite American-Israeli-Palestinian summit to make any startling breakthroughs. For days, spokesmen for U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas had been lowering expectations.

Rice initially envisaged the Monday, Feb. 19 summit as a festive opening of three-way talks on the establishment of a Palestinian state. But the agreement between the radical Hamas and the more moderate Fatah to establish a Palestinian unity government that probably won’t overtly recognize Israel altered the focus.

Rice and Olmert used the summit to make it clear to Abbas that the United States and Israel will boycott the new Palestinian government unless it meets the international quartet’s three benchmark conditions: recognition of Israel, acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and renunciation of violence.

Still, the summit was not without its achievements. It clarified what the Palestinian side needs to do to get the yearlong international economic boycott lifted, and broached new ideas for advancing the peace “road map.” It also made clear that peace talks with Abbas, a Fatah leader who does accept the three benchmark conditions, would continue even if the new Palestinian government does not follow his lead.

What happens next will depend on how skillfully the parties maneuver in trying to advance their often-disparate agendas. For example, how far they are able to move along the peace road will depend to a large extent on how the new power-sharing arrangements between Hamas and Fatah play out.

Will Fatah be able to use Hamas’ support of the unity government to move the process forward, or will Hamas be able to exploit a Fatah fig leaf to have international sanctions lifted without making any political or ideological concessions? Will Abbas be able to move the talks toward the two-state final peace deal he wants, or will Hamas limit him to no more than the long-term ceasefire?

In cutting the national unity deal with Fatah in Mecca in early February, Hamas had two major priorities: ending weeks of dangerous internecine fighting with Fatah before it escalated into full-blown civil war and getting the international boycott on the Palestinians lifted.

For Hamas, the problem is how to get the boycott lifted without making ideological concessions — such as recognizing Israel. The solution has been to give Abbas a free hand to negotiate in the hope that progress will entail at least a gradual easing of the sanctions. But what will Hamas do if there is a diplomatic breakthrough, come on board or try to spoil it?

The classic Hamas strategy is based on the assumption that time is on the side of the Palestinians. Hamas leaders argue that the regional balance is tilting against Israel and that over time, the Palestinians will prevail. Therefore, they oppose a two-state solution and seek a long-term ceasefire, which they hope will lead to the lifting of the international boycott and enable their militia to build up its power for another round against Israel.

Some Fatah spokesmen, however, detect a looming transformation in Hamas thinking. They argue that the Mecca agreement heralds a movement toward Abbas’ position that violence against Israel is counterproductive and that Hamas may be ready, under certain circumstances, to consider the merits of a two-state solution. If that is the case, Abbas may be given license to go all the way.

In any event, Abbas hopes to use the negotiations to transform the everyday life of Palestinians and restore Fatah’s political dominance. His goal in talks with Israel is to get a negotiation framework for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace deal in place so he can offer the Palestinians a “political horizon.” He also wants Palestinian prisoners released and Israeli army roadblocks in the West Bank lifted.

On Monday, Abbas reiterated the importance of these gestures in the struggle for Palestinian opinion and, in return, promised that the new Palestinian government would do all it could to release the abducted Israeli soldier Cpl. Gilad Shalit and stop Kassam rockets fired from Gaza.

By improving his image among the Palestinian people, Abbas hopes he and Fatah will be able to win new elections. When they come, he wants to be able to say that Fatah can deliver on statehood and large-scale foreign investment, whereas Hamas can offer only more suffering.

In this situation, the American game has been to adopt a carrot-and-stick policy to convince the Palestinians to move on the two-state track. To encourage the Palestinian side during the summit, Rice suggested discussing all aspects of the road map simultaneously, including statehood, but implementing the stages sequentially, from ceasefire to Palestinian mini-state to full-fledged Palestinian statehood.

Olmert is skeptical about the chances of resolving final-status issues like Jerusalem or refugees. Indeed, he maintains that discussing them prematurely could do more harm than good.

So, ironically, like Hamas, Olmert also prefers a ceasefire without the trappings of Palestinian statehood.

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